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Abstract
We address the problem faced by innovators who have an idea for a marketable product but
must hire employees to bring the product to the market. Information leakage implies that newly
hired employees become informed of the idea and may attempt to bring the product to the
market themselves. We develop a bargaining model to analyze this situation. In this model,
employees rents endogenously reßect the bargaining power vis-a-vis the Þrm which is due to
the knowledge of the information. The model has a unique symmetric equilibrium in which
the innovator appropriates a sizable share of the surplus despite the absence of property rights
for ideas. We show that this share stays bounded away from zero even as the number of agents
required in the development grows to inÞnity. We also derive the conditions under which monopoly
or competition arise on the product market. We Þnd that when the degree of potential competition
on the product market is high enough, a monopoly is generated by hiring all potential competitors
within the same Þrm. Finally, the link between intellectual property rights enforcement and
industry performance is explored, and normative implications are derived.
1 Introduction
In this paper we analyze the process of innovation when Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) are
not perfectly enforceable. We focus on two main issues: the innovators appropriation rates and
the market structure that may endogenously be determined by information leakage concerns.
To better understand these two issues, consider the following analogous story. A person Þnds a
map illustrating the location of a treasure on an island. In order to reach the island, this person
needs the help of others. In the process of trying to recruit help, information on the whereabouts
of the treasure may leak. At this point, nothing prevents the new recruits from leaving the owner
of the map and trying to Þnd the treasure with someone else.
A Þrst set of questions arises because the information laid down on the map is not protected.
How is the map owners position affected by the risk of information leakage? What share of the
treasure would he have to offer to his companions? Will he have enough incentives to try and
look for the treasure?
An additional set of issues arises after the treasure has been found. Assume that the Þrst team
to reach the treasure is not protected against others trying to steal it. The holders of the treasure
are therefore always at risk of being robbed, as long as other people know about its existence.
More speciÞcally, consider a group of people who initially know about the map. Will they reach
the treasure all together as one team? If they do, they will not face the risk of robbery after they
Þnd it. On the other hand, the treasure will have to be split among many people. Alternatively,
it could be that some in the group may have an incentive to form a smaller team. Small teams
involve less people to share the pie among. However, as these teams may end up robbing one
another, the pie each of them will share is smaller. Do we expect to see one team enjoying the
treasure or numerous teams Þghting for it at the end of the day?
As for innovation, it starts with an idea. The idea evolves into a new product, and then the
product enters the market. Developing an idea from the initial concept to a marketable commodity
is a process that exposes inventors to different kinds of risks.
Information sharing is often necessary to the development process. When information has been
shared and employees defect, an innovator may loose control of his idea. Employees defection can
hurt an innovator in two fundamental ways. First, defection may result in a race to hit the market
Þrst (reaching the treasure). This could mean the loss of any rents innovators could secure by an
incumbency advantage. Second, defection may result in future competition in the market for the
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Þnal product (Þghting over the treasure). Even if an incumbent advantage is assured, innovators
proÞts may decrease due to the presence of new competitors.
Legal systems may provide means of protecting innovators ideas by enforcing IPR.1 In practice,
the enforcement of these rights is often problematic.2 In fact, the intrinsic nature of ideas makes
it difficult to deÞne property rights and to prove their violations. Moreover, it has been suggested
that the degree of enforcement of property rights, which changes across states and industrial re-
gions, may inßuence the conÞguration of local industries and their fortunes.3 This raises questions
about the relation between the enforcement of IPR and the performance of industries.
We analyze a model of the formation of new Þrms in the absence of perfect IPR. In the model
agents make offers to other agents to start a collaboration on a new business idea. The crucial
feature of the model is the presence of information leakage. We assume that the development of
an idea requires collaboration and that collaboration entails information sharing.
This environment suggests a natural protocol for a bargaining game. Suppose an innovator
has an idea that needs to be developed with at least one other agent. At the beginning of the
bargaining game, the innovator can make an offer to any subset of a pool of agents. All agents who
receive the offer learn the idea, i.e. become informed. If the offer is accepted by everybody, a
Þrm forms and the development takes place. If the offer is rejected by someone, a new negotiation
ensues. As the set of informed agents is enlarged, the race to carry out the development is more
intense. We model the intensity of the race by assuming that the probability any agent makes
the next offer is inversely related to the number of informed agents.
The continuation of the game after one Þrm has formed depends on the legal regime under
scrutiny. We consider two legal regimes. First, in a Partial Protection regime, ideas are not pro-
tected during the development stage, but patents are granted when the development is completed.
1The enforcement of no-compete agreements and, to some extent, trade secret law protect inventors from infor-
mation leakage during the development stage. The patent system aims to guarantee inventors a monopoly on the
product market.
2Areeda and Kaplow (1998) argue that it is often the case that even if patents are granted, it is considered
unlikely they will stand in court if ever litigated. Besen and Raskind (1991) and Fisk (2001) discuss the limitations
of the enforcement of trade secrets law and no-compete agreements.
3See Hyde (2000) and Gilson (2000) for the comparison between the Silicon Valley and the Route 128 (Mass.)
industrial regions. Both these studies stress how, in contrast with common wisdom, the weak enforcement of no-
compete clauses granted by California law may have contributed to the success of Silicon Valley. His argument
rests mainly on the assumption that weak IPR imply information diffusion, which in turn stimulates incremental
research and hence innovation.
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In this case, the game ends when an offer is accepted and the Þrst Þrm forms.4
Second, we analyze a No Protection regime. In this regime, patents cannot be granted at the
end of the development stage. If this is the case, if the Þrst Þrm to form does not employ all the
informed agents, the game continues. The informed agents that are still unemployed can apply
the idea to an identical or similar product and generate competition in the Þnal product market.
We measure the appropriation rates of innovators operating under the different legal regimes.
In the Partial Protection regime, we Þnd that there is a unique equilibrium in which the innovator
always receives a surprisingly high share of the proÞts.5 In particular, if two agents are necessary
to develop the product, as the bargaining frictions disappear the share of the innovator goes to
1− e−1, i.e. 63% of the proÞts. If the number of people necessary to develop the product goes to
inÞnity, the appropriation rate of the innovator goes to e−1, i.e. 34% of the proÞts. This means
that the information leakage problem does not dissipate an innovators payoff even when the idea
requires many employees and forces him to face the potential defection of all of them.
The innovators success is due both to a Þrst-mover advantage (that disappears as frictions
become negligible) and to a second, novel effect that is robust to the disappearance of bargaining
frictions. We refer to this effect as the information diffusion advantage.6
The intuition behind the information diffusion advantage is the following. Suppose that there
are four agents in the game. Agents 1 and 2 are informed about the idea, and agents 3 and 4 are
not. Suppose that agent 1 is chosen as next proposer. He has to decide whether to form a Þrm
with agent 2, who is already informed, or to diffuse the information further by hiring a new agent,
say agent 3. The more agents that are informed about the idea, the higher the competition in the
race to make the next offer. This suggests that agent 3 maybe cheaper to hire than agent 2, so
that diffusing the information is preferable. On the other hand, if the continuation values of the
agents decrease as the number of informed agents increases, by making an offer to an uniformed
agent, agent 1 lowers the wage agent 3 will have to pay his employee, i.e. agent 4, upon rejection,
in the event agent 3 will become the next proposer. This suggests that a proposer may want to
4The analysis of this legal scenario in the presence of information leakage captures a novel aspect of patent races.
Any team of agents working to develop a patentable product are subject to the risk of competition arising from
within. Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980), Lee and Wilde (1980) and Loury (1979) have analyzed patent races, but
these papers do not analyze the infomational aspects of the development stage.
5 In our analysis, we focus our attention on the set of the Symmetric Subgame Perfect Equilibria.
6For a competitive treatment of information diffusion, see Chari and Hopenhayn (1991) and Jovanovic and
McDonald (1994).
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keep the number of informed agents low, and hire an informed agent rather than an uninformed
one. We show that the Þrst effect is stronger. This implies that information gets diffused to
more and more new agents off the equilibrium path. The net effect, or the information diffusion
advantage, works in favor of the innovator as it decreases the continuation value of her employee.
Let us now turn to the No Protection regime. In the total absence of IPR, patents are not
available to guarantee a monopoly at the end of the development process. An agent who is about
to make an offer has to consider the effect of his offer on the Þnal product market structure.
Besides the potential defection of the agents he hires, a proposer has to evaluate the threat of
future market competition. Thus, he faces an additional trade-off. In particular, he can either
preempt the potential competition on the Þnal product market by hiring all the agents that could
potentiality compete with him (i.e. all the informed agents), or he can form a Þrm in the least
expensive way, and face competition on the Þnal product market.
We show that even in the absence of any kind of IPR two equilibrium effects enable innovators
to appropriate signiÞcant shares of the proÞts. First, we show that for a range of parameters the
innovator still enjoys the information diffusion advantage. Second, higher rents for the innovator
can be sustained by a new effect that we term the Threat of Competition Advantage. We show
that the innovator is sometimes able to credibly threaten his employees of competition arising
upon rejection of his offer. As competition dissipates rents, this tends to lower the continuation
value of potential employees. Thus, this threat enables the innovator to appropriate all of the
gap between monopoly rents and the total rents under market competition. This implies that the
Þercer is the potential market competition, the stronger is the position of the innovator.
We show that there is a limit to the ability of the innovator to use the threat of competition.
In particular, when the degree of potential market competition is very high, the threat of future
competition is not credible any longer. Upon rejection of an offer, agents always have incentives to
avoid competition and they tend to make offers that generate monopoly. This keeps the innovators
payoffs at the minimum as both the information diffusion and the threat of competition advantages
cease to hold.
Our analysis of the No Protection regime offers predictions on information diffusion and market
structure outcomes when several agents are initially informed about the idea. We show that, even
in absence of IPR, it may very well be that monopoly is the market outcome. This happens
if the degree of potential market competition is high, and in this case, all information remains
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concentrated inside the boundaries of a single Þrm.7 On the other hand, if the degree of potential
competition on the Þnal product market is low, competition is the equilibrium market outcome.
Both economists and legal scholars are involved in an ongoing debate about the optimal deÞ-
nition, extent, and enforcement of IPR.8 This debate aims to identify costs and beneÞts of such
protection in terms of economic efficiency. From our results, we derive normative implications.9
First, our paper contributes to the literature on the optimal deÞnition of IPR suggesting that
the impact of IPR on incentives to innovate has been generally overestimated. In particular, our
results show that, in the absence of perfect IPR, equilibrium effects protect inventors payoffs
from dissipation.
Second, our results also have important normative implications for the relation between the
enforcement of property rights and industry performance. In our model, employees are paid
according to the information they hold and not according to their productivity. In the presence
of many agents competing for the same job, one would expect that employee rents would be low.
In our model, in contrast, information leakage creates a wedge between informed and uninformed
agents, giving the informed ones bargaining power vis-a-vis the employer. This entails strictly
positive rents for employees.
In an extension of the model discussed in Section 5.2, when the development process requires
a two-sided, non-contractable investment by employer and employee, perfect property rights pro-
tection may result in investment levels that are inefficient. Our model provides an endogenous
determination of the division of rents within the Þrm. We provide an example in which the pres-
ence of information leakage entails more efficient effort levels within Þrms compared with the case
of perfect protection of IPR.
The Þrst ones to approach the informational concerns of inventors in the absence of IPR have
been Anton and Yao (1994). Anton and Yao present a model in which a Þnancially weak inventor
faces two manufacturers that can market his product. In the negotiation with the Þrst manu-
facturer, he can increase his bargaining power by threatening to reveal his idea to a competitor.
The main difference between their approach and ours is their assumption that, once they learn
the idea, manufacturers do not face problems of information leakage. Our approach rests on the
observation that in the absence of property rights, a manufacturer who employs some workers
7This is in line with studies suggesting that many Þrms rely on secrecy more than on patent protection to protect
their R&D. See Levin, Klevorick, Nelson and Winter (1987).
8Among many, see Arrow (1962), Hughes (1988), Ordover (1991), Scotchmer (1991).
9We further discuss normative implications in Section 5.
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may eventually face the same information leakage problem that the innovator faced in the Þrst
place. This difference in the approach suggests an alternative bargaining model and signiÞcant
differences in the results, that we discuss in detail in Section 3.
Our model also relates to the notion that the employees of a Þrm could be tempted to appro-
priate the source of the rent of the Þrm. Rajan and Zingales (2001) carry out an analysis of the
optimal design of a hierarchy to prevent employees from doing so. The difference in the focus of
the analysis is reßected in the modelling assumptions: in their model, employees bargain on their
wage after deciding whether to stay in the Þrm or to defect. In our model the defection decision
can occur at any moment between the bargaining and the completion of the development process,
so it affects the outcome of the bargaining.10
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we present the model and a benchmark in
which IPR are perfectly enforced. In Section 3, we analyze the Partial Protection regime. In
Section 4 we discuss the No Protection regime. In Section 5, we discuss the main assumptions
and the normative implications of the model.
2 The model
The strategic situation outlined in the introduction suggest a natural protocol for a bargaining
model. Three assumptions underlie this protocol.11 First, we assume that no agent can develop
an idea into a product on his own. Second, we assume that the act of recruiting entails sharing
information about the idea. Finally, our third assumption relates to the asymmetry between
informed and uninformed agents. The only element differentiating otherwise homogeneous agents
is the knowledge of the idea. We capture this asymmetry by assuming that offers can be made
only by informed agents.12
10For other papers that relate the possibility of employees defection to the distribution of wages within the Þrm,
see Stole and Zweibel (1994), Wolinsky (2000) and Zabojnik (2000). In particular, Zabojnik (2000) explores how
hierarchical Þrms pay employees efficiency wages in accordance with the potential threat of their leaving the Þrm
with relevant information. The common element between Zabojniks and our paper is the idea that wages are not
fully explained by the productivity of the employees but rather they incorporate the relevance of the information
employees hold. However, while Zabojnik models the threat as an external technology, we endogenize the process
that makes this information a threat for the employer by explicitly modeling the continuation game.
11The assumptions of this model are discussed further in Section 5.
12This assumption is motivated by the uninformed agents being unaware of the existence of the idea or of its
potential proÞtability. They become aware of it only when approached by an informed agent for the Þrst time.
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We now present the model in detail. Let us consider a Þnite set of agents N , with card(N) ≡
n > 2, among which there is a set of innovators K0 = {1, 2, .., k0} that have an idea for a business
venture. All the agents in N\K0 are initially unaware of the business idea. If developed, this idea
can be implemented into one or more marketable products. The process of developing the idea
requires the work of several agents. First, we assume, for simplicity, that the work of exactly two
agents is required to turn the idea into each marketable product.13
Knowledge of the idea is necessary for any group of agents to develop the idea into products.
Thus, if all the informed agents are in one Þrm, this Þrm enjoys a monopoly in the product market.
Any knowledgeable agent who is not part of any existing Þrm can always try and form her own
Þrm and develop the same or a similar product. This new Þrm will compete to some degree with
the Þrst Þrm on the Þnal product market. We assume that the market can accommodate only
two Þrms. We normalize the present value of all the proÞts earned by the Þrst Þrm if the second
Þrm never enters the market to be equal to 1. Let π2 be the present value of all the proÞts earned
by the second Þrm in competition. Then, notice that the present value of all the proÞts earned
by the Þrst Þrm is increasing in the delay with which the second Þrm enters the market. We let
π1 ≤ 1 be the present value of all the proÞts of the Þrst Þrm if a second Þrm forms after one
period.14 Since the incumbent Þrm markets neither the second product nor both products, we
assume π1 ≥ π2 and π1 + π2 ≤ 1.15
The structure of the game builds recursively on two types of negotiation subgames. What
distinguishes the two types of subgames is whether one Þrm has already formed or it has not.
Suppose we are at some history along the game at which a Þrm has not yet formed and the
set of the informed agents, i.e. the agents who know the idea, is K0 ⊇ K0. We are now ready to
introduce the Þrst negotiation subgame. We assume that nature chooses with equal probability
among the informed agents in K 0 the next agent to make an offer. The chosen agent, say agent
13 In Section 3.1, this assumption is relaxed.
14Let product πm1 and π
m
2 be the monopolistic proÞt earned in one period by a Þrm producing the Þrst and the






2 be the proÞts earned in one period by a Þrm producing
the Þrst and the second product, respectively, when both products are present on the market. Let the Þrst product
be the most proÞtable one, i.e. πm1 ≥ πm2 and πc1 ≥ πc2. Observe that if a second Þrm enters the market x periods
after the Þrst one, the Þrst Þrm earns πm1 for x periods, and then it starts earning π
c
1 from then on. The payoff of






1−δ . However, since a second Þrm never forms after more than one period
after the Þrst one, nothing changes in our analysis if we just assume the payoff of the Þrst Þrm always to be equal
to π1 ≡ π1 (1) .
15See Section 5.1 for a discussion of the implications of relaxing the hypothesis π1 + π2 ≤ 1.
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i ∈ K0, can propose a division of the surplus to a set of agents C0 ⊂ N\{i}. The division of the
surplus, α, is a vector α ∈ ∆card(C), where ∆card(C0). is the simplex in Rcard(C) An offer is fully
represented by the pair (C 0,α). The agents in C0 have to decide simultaneously whether to reject
or to accept the offer. The crucial assumption in this model is that all of the agents who receive
an offer become informed, and the set of the informed agents becomes C 0 ∪K 0. If at least one
agent in C 0 rejects the offer, they enter a negotiation subgame in which no Þrm has formed. If all
accept, then the Þrst Þrm is formed, and two resulting cases are possible.
If C0 ⊇ K0\ {i}, i.e. all the other informed agents are included in the offer, then the game ends;
the Þrm implements the idea and enjoys a monopoly status. Any agent j ∈ C 0 receives αj, agent
i receives (1−Pj∈C0 αj), and agents in N\ (C 0 ∪ {i}) receive zero. We refer to an offer such that
C0 ⊇ K 0\ {i} as a grand coalition offer. If C 0 + K 0\ {i}, not all the informed agents become part
of the Þrst Þrm. The informed agents that are not part of the Þrst Þrm can keep on negotiating
and form a second Þrm. We therefore enter a second type of negotiation subgame in which one
Þrm has formed and for which the set of informed agents left in the game is K 0\ (C0 ∪ {i}) . In
any terminal node following this history agent i receives (1−Pj∈C0 αj)π1 and any agent j ∈ C 0
receives αjπ1. We refer to an offer such that C0 + K0\ {i} as a cost minimizing offer.
Let us now introduce the second type of negotiation subgame. Such subgames ensue after
some agent i has already formed a Þrm making a successful offer to the set of agents C0. Let
K 00 be the set of informed agents left in the game. With equal probability, an agent h is chosen
from K 00 to propose a division of the surplus to a set of agents C 00 ⊂ N\(C 0 ∪ {i} ∪ {h}).
Let β ∈ ∆card(C0) be the proposed division. If everybody accepts the offer, the game ends,
agent h receives (1 −Pj∈C00 βj)π2, and any agent j ∈ C 00 receives βjπ2. All the agents in
N\(C0 ∪ C00 ∪ {i} ∪ {h}) receive zero. If someone in C00 rejects offer β, then the we enter a
negotiation subgame in which one Þrm has formed and for which the set of informed agents is
K 00 ∪C 00.
Note that we use unanimity as the rule that governs the formation of a Þrm, so that the offers
are conditional upon the acceptance of all the agents involved. This implies that agents cannot
make an offer that is binding on his side as soon as at least one agent accepts it (unconditional
offer).16
The game begins with a negotiation subgame for which the set of informed agents is K0. We
assume that there are frictions in bargaining due to impatience. These frictions are represented
16 In Section 5, this assumption is discussed in detail.
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by a common discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1). Every time we enter a negotiation subgame, payoffs in
that subgame are discounted by δ. If no agreement is reached, we assume payoffs are zero. All
the agents have reservation value normalized to zero and are risk-neutral.
Before we specify the notion of equilibrium we adopt, let us introduce the set of possible histories
of this game, H. The set H can be decomposed into the subsets HO, HR, HN and HT . The set HO
includes all the histories at which an agent is called to make an offer, and we denote by hi a generic
history in HO at which agent i is called to make an offer. The set HR includes all the histories at
which agents are simultaneously called to reply to an offer, the set HN includes all the histories at
which nature chooses the next proposer, and the set HT include all the terminal histories. Every
history in HO is followed by a history in HR, and every history in HR is followed either by a
history in HT or by a history in HN . Every history in HN is followed by a history in HO. Let
K (h) be the set of informed agents in the game at history h ∈ H, and let k (h) ≡ card (K (h)).
For any player i ∈ N, a strategy si is deÞned for all histories in H at which agent i takes an
action, speciÞcally for all histories in HO at which he is called to make an offer and all histories
in HR at which he is called to reply.
To analyze this model, we look at Symmetric Subgame Perfect Equilibria (SSPE).17 Among the
SSPE, we look at those in which agents do not use weakly dominated actions when responding
to offers.18
In the analysis of the model, we compute the continuation values of the players at histories
h ∈ HN , i.e., when nature is about to choose the next proposer and the payoffs are about to be
discounted. We denote the continuation value of agent i at a given history h as vi (h) .
A property of the SSPE is that for any h ∈ HN , all the informed agents have the same
continuation value, or vi (h) = vj (h) = v (h) for all i, j ∈ K (h).19
17For the formal deÞnition of SSPE we refer to the Appendix. In Section 5, we discuss the implications of
restricting attention to SSPE.
18This assumption is important only in Subsection 3.1 and Section 4, where situations in which proposers are
forced to make offers to more than one agent become relavant. We want to rule out equilibria that are sustained
by the mere fact that agents are not pivotal. For example, one can sustain equilibria in which offers to more than
one agent are never accepted by any agent. These strategies could be chosen in equilibrium as, by our unanimity
assumption, no agent is pivotal in the acceptance or rejection of such offer. By assuming away weakly dominated
actions, we guarantee that an agent who desires the offer to be accepted, votes in its favor.
19 In the remaining of the paper, we often analyze equilibria in which the continuation values of the informed
agents are the same at any history characterized by the same number of informed agents (i.e. v (h) = v (h0) for any
h, h0 ∈ HN such that k (h) = k (h0)). If this is the case, we use the notation vk(h) ≡ v (h) = v (h0).
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2.1 The Perfect Protection Benchmark
Before presenting the benchmark of our model in the case in which IPR are perfectly deÞned,
we want to make a distinction between two different types of protection and their respective
enforcement. As we already mentioned in Section 1, the presence of information leakage exposes
innovators to two fundamental risks. When the inventor initially contacts people to start the
development of the idea, he faces the possibility that employees will defect and start their own
development team. A perfect protection against this kind of risk should be able to guarantee
that in the case in which the project is not developed by the original inventor, the identity of the
inventor can be perfectly observed, and he gets the restitution of the full value of his own idea.20
When a Þrm introduces a product on the market, it faces the possibility that other Þrms may
compete with the same or a similar product. Perfect protection against market competition
guarantees that when competition appears, monopolistic proÞts can be computed and awarded
to the Þrst Þrm.21
As a benchmark of our model, we analyze what happens if both means of IPR are perfectly
enforceable. We therefore assume the following two assumptions. First, the completion of the
development of an idea guarantees a monopoly on the Þnal market. In our model, this amounts
to assuming that π1 = 1 and π2 = 0. Second, innovators have the right to collect the proÞts
earned by their ideas. This implies that when there are k0 initial innovators, every innovator, at
any terminal history in which he is not included in the Þrm that develops the idea, can obtain the
restitution of 1k0 .
2223
We claim that when IPR on ideas are perfectly protected, in all SSPE innovators appropriate the
full value of their ideas.24 Consider the case of a single innovator. Note Þrst that any proposer has
20The legal remedies that approximate this kind of protection are the enforcement of no-compete agreements
and, to some respect, trade secret law. The applicability of trade secret law is not restricted to the development
process per se. However, it has been noted (see Ordover (1991)) that it can provide protection in the process that
leads to the application for a patent.
21The traditional protection against this kind of risk is the patent system.
22While in the case of a single innovator (i.e., k0 = 1) no-compete clauses are able to guarantee this kind of
protection, in the case of multiple innovators no-compete clauses only protect the innovator who makes the Þrst
offer.
23We limit the restitution to be allowed only when an innovator is not part of the Þrm because we want to allow
agents to be able to write contracts that stand in court when IPR are enforced.
24Notice that the notion of Symmetry must be sightly readapted for this benchmark. In fact, since the payoff
of a Þrm depend on the innovator being included or not, we must allow for offers to discriminate agents on the
fact of their being the innovator or not. It is very simple to deÞne a suitable notion of anonimity, where offers can
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to include the innovator in his offer to avoid the collection of the full value by the innovator after
the formation of the Þrm. Therefore, the innovator is included in any offer made in equilibrium.
This guarantees that the innovator appropriates π1 = 1.25 It is easy to see that this result holds
also in the case in which there are k0 > 1 initial innovators.26
In the next section, we start analyzing imperfect property rights protection.
3 The Partial Protection Regime
In this section, we analyze the case in which patent protection is available, but information leakage
can damage innovators during the development stage (i.e., the Partial Protection regime). In
the model, this case can be represented by assuming that π1 = 1 and π2 = 0. In Proposition 1,
we characterize the unique SSPE for any initial set of innovators K0. Then, in Corollary 2, we
focus on the appropriation rate of a single innovator (i.e., K0 = {1}). All the proofs are presented
in the Appendix.
Proposition 1 In the Partial Protection Regime, there is a unique SSPE. In this equilibrium
each proposer always makes offers to one agent. In the subgames in which there are uninformed
agents, proposers always choose to offer to an uninformed agent rather than an informed one.
Recall that we denote by vk the continuation value of an informed agent at a history h ∈ HN in
which there are k (h) informed players. To build the unique equilibrium sequence {vk}nk=2 of the
continuation values of each informed player, start with n informed agents. When everybody is
informed, symmetry guarantees that the continuation value of every player is vn = δn , i.e., 1/n-th
fraction of the discounted pie δ.
When n− 1 agents are informed, consider the options of a proposer. He can either form a Þrm
only with informed agents, or he can include an uninformed agent in his offer. If the offer includes
discriminate only on the basis of agents being informed or not and on the basis of agents being the innovator or
not.
25To see this, focus on a subgame in which everybody is informed, and let v and v be the maximum and
the minimum continuation value sustainable in equilibrium for the innovator, respectively. Then, every other
agent must have 1−v
n−1 and
1−v

















v, which together imply v = v = 1. Then, the innovator can
always appropriate 1 by offering 0 to all the other agents in the initial offer.
26To see this, observe that in this case agents include all the innovators in the offers. Then, when everybody
is informed, if the continuation value of the innovators sustainable in equilibrium are assumed to be in the range
[v, v] , we have v ≤ 1
n
(1− (k − 1) v) + n−1
n
v and v ≤ 1
n
(1− (k − 1) v) + n−1
n




the uninformed agent, every agent has to be paid δn . Suppose that he only offers to informed
agents. Upon rejection, each of them is chosen as next proposer with probability 1n−1 . In that
event, each can guarantee themselves at least 1 − δn by making an offer to the only uninformed




represent a lower bound of the continuation value of an




> δn , it is always optimal to offer to the only uninformed





Working by backwards induction on the number of informed agents, assume that k < n agents
are informed, and the continuation value sequence is deÞned by vh = δh (1− vh+1) for all h ∈
{k + 1, .., n− 1}. Again, by making an offer to an informed agent, a proposer has to pay him at
least δk (1− vk+1), and it can be shown that δk (1− vk+1) > vk+1. This implies that it is always
optimal to make an offer to an uninformed agent rather than an informed one (i.e. information
diffuses off the equilibrium path), and that vk = δk (1− vk+1). Moreover, since the sequence
{vl}nl=k+1 displays the property mvk+m > (m+ 1) vk+m+1 for any m ≥ 1, it is not optimal to
make an offer to more than one agent.
Let us now turn to the intuition behind the information diffusion. Focus on a proposer that
has to choose between making an offer to either an uninformed agent or an informed one when k
agents are informed. By offering to an informed agent (or to a subset of the informed agents), the
proposer forces that agent to choose between joining the Þrm or rejecting the offer and competing
against k other informed agents. By offering to an uninformed agent, the proposer makes him
choose between joining the Þrm and competing against k+1 informed agents. Thus, uninformed
agents face a Þercer competition upon rejection, and this tends to lower their continuation value.
This effect tends to make uninformed agents cheaper to recruit than informed ones. On the other
hand, after receiving an offer and becoming informed, by the inductive hypotesis, we know that
an uninformed agent will have cheaper potential employees in the event that, upon rejection, he
is chosen to make the next offer. This effect tends to increase an uninformed agents continuation
value with respect to the one of an informed agent. Proposition 1 shows that in equilibrium the
Þrst effect is stronger. Thus, it is optimal to hire uninformed agents, and in equilibrium more and
more agents become informed off the equilibrium path.
At this point, one could be tempted to think that if the threat of future competition makes
hiring uninformed agents cheaper, a proposer could proÞt from ßooding the market by making
offers to many agents. Proposition 1 shows that this is never proÞtable. By offering to many
uninformed agents, one reduces their continuation payoffs but also promises a share to each of
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them. As the continuation values decrease with decreasing increments, it is not proÞtable to
ßood the market.
Proposition 1 allows us to compute the appropriation rate of a single innovator with an original
idea, that faces the risk of information leakage.27 In the equilibrium presented in Proposition 1,
the innovators appropriation rate is 1− v2. Since v2 is a function of the number of agents in the
game n and of the discount factor δ, we denote the appropriation rate v (δ, n) ≡ 1− v2 (δ, n). We
denote v (1, n) ≡ limδ→1 v (δ, n) and v (δ,∞) ≡ limn→∞ v (δ, n).





Observe that Corollary 2 implies that v (1,∞) = 1−e−1 ' 0.632, i.e. as the bargaining frictions
disappear the innovator appropriates 63.2% of the value of his idea. This implies that the innovator
enjoys an advantage that is not driven by legal enforcement but rather by equilibrium incentives.
Corollary 2 suggests that the structure of the equilibrium described in Proposition 1 guarantees
that the innovators appropriation rate is not fully explained by the Þrst-mover advantage.
To see how this result departs from the standard bargaining literature, consider what happens
in our model when n = 2. It is easy to see that in the only SPE, proposers always offer δ2 , and
agents always accept the offer. As the players get more patient (δ tends to 1), the Þrst-mover
advantage of the Þrst proposer vanishes, and his payoff goes to 12 .
It is also possible to contrast Proposition 1 and Corollary 2 with a version of bargaining model
in which information diffusion is possible, but does not inßuence the innovators payoff. Consider
the case in which there are n > 2 agents. However, when an agent rejects an offer, he is the next
proposer with probability 1 (when more than one agent simultaneously reject the same offer, each
of them becomes the next proposer with the same probability). Consider an equilibrium in which
proposers always offer v = δ1+δ to one agent. This is an equilibrium as v satisÞes v = δ (1− v). In
this equilibrium the information diffusion does not play any role, and the payoff of the innovator
is 1− δ1+δ , which is higher than 12 only due to a Þrst-mover advantage. In this equilibrium, making
offers to uninformed agents is the same as making offers to informed agents since the competition
among informed agents never arises.
In our case, we have that limδ→1 v (δ, n) = 1 − 12 (1− v3) > 12 for all n and δ. This is due
to the presence of many agents and the competition arising upon rejection of any offer. In fact,
27The result can be easily related to the case of several initial innovators.
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off the equilibrium path, more and more agents become informed about the idea. This implies
that upon rejection of an offer, the surplus is not going to be divided only among the current
informed agents but among a larger set of agents. This effect works in favor of the innovator,
as it lowers the continuation value of the agent he hires. We name δ2 − v2, which is the portion
of the appropriation rate not explained by the Þrst-mover advantage, the information diffusion
advantage.
3.1 Information Leakage and Larger Firm Size
The results presented so far rest on the assumption that only two agents are needed to develop
an idea. If this is the case, innovators are able to appropriate a sizable share of the proceeds of
their own ideas even in the absence of perfect IPR. One may wonder whether this prediction is
robust with respect to a more demanding production technology. We model this by increasing
the number of people required to develop an idea. When innovators need to hire many agents,
they face the potential defection of all of them. Does this result in the total dissipation of an
innovators appropriation rate? Proposition 3 is a Þrst step in this direction, since it generalizes
Proposition 1 to larger Þrm size. All the proofs are in the Appendix.
Proposition 3 In the Partial Protection regime, if m+ 1 ≤ n agents are needed to develop an
idea, there is a unique SSPE. In this equilibrium the proposers always make offers to m agents. In
the subgames in which there are uninformed agents, proposers always make offers to uninformed
agents rather than informed ones.
Proposition 3 guarantees that the equilibrium structure when m > 1 is similar to the case
in which m = 1 we studied before. Proposers always offer to exactly m uninformed agents as
long as the number of informed agent is less or equal to n −m. At histories where k > n −m,
proposers offer to all the uninformed agents (nU = n − k (hi)) and to the number of informed
agents necessary to form the Þrm (i.e. nI = m− n+ k (hi)). The equilibrium continuation value
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for 2 ≤ k < n−m. One can show that {vmk }nk=2 is decreasing, which implies that it is optimal
to hire uninformed agents rather than informed ones, as long as enough uninformed agents are
left on the market. This allows the proposer to exploit the additional competition that will occur
following a rejection. The temptation of ßooding the market by offering to more than m people
in order to lower their continuation value turns out to be suboptimal as in the m = 1 case.
Let us now focus attention on the case in which there is a single innovator and let us Þnd his
appropriation rate. Let v(m, δ, n) ≡ 1−mvmm+1 be the innovators payoff when m+ 1 agents are
required to form a Þrm, n is the number of agents in the game, and δ is the discount factor. Let
v(m, δ,∞) ≡ limn→∞ v(m, δ, n).
Corollary 4 If m+ 1 < n agents are needed to develop an idea and there is a single innovator,
limm→∞ v(m, δ,∞) = e−δ > 0.
For very large m, and as the bargaining frictions disappear, the presence of the information
diffusion advantage keeps the appropriation rate bounded away from zero. Observe that Corollary
4 implies that v (∞, 1,∞) = e−1, i.e., the innovators share as the number of agents required to
develop the product grows to inÞnity is always larger than 0.368. This implies that the innovator
is able to appropriate a sizable share of proÞts even though he needs to hire many agents to
develop the business idea. Again, this result is driven by the presence of an information diffusion
advantage. In fact, consider anm+1-player version of our bargaining game. In the only SSPE, the
Þrst proposer appropriates 1− δmm+1 .Note that as δ tends to 1, the Þrst mover advantage disappears,
and the innovator appropriates 1m+1 . For high m, the appropriation rate of the innovator goes to
zero.
In our case, the innovator appropriates v(m, δ, n) > 1−m δm+1 . The differencem δm+1−mvm+1 is
the information diffusion advantage for the m > 1 case. Once again, the innovator beneÞts from
the presence of information diffusion in equilibrium. In fact, information diffusion guarantees that
upon rejection of an offer, informed agents anticipate some dissipation of the value to uninformed
agents. This tends to decrease their continuation value and improves the position of a proposer.
As the number of people required to form a Þrm is larger, information diffuses faster, and the
information diffusion advantage becomes stronger.
This concludes the analysis of the Partial Protection regime. In the next section, we analyze
the No Protection regime.
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4 The No Protection Regime
In the previous section we analyzed the Partial Protection regime in which patents were available
at the end of the development process. Therefore, the Þrst Þrm that formed enjoyed a monopoly
on the Þnal product market. In that case, the innovators payoff was substantial due to the
information diffusion that occurred off the equilibrium path.
We now analyze a situation in which patents are not available (i.e. No Protection regime),
and the market can accommodate more than one Þrm. If this is the case, a monopoly is not
guaranteed after the creation of the Þrst Þrm. As a result, proposers face two problems when
trying to form a Þrm. First, since the information gets transmitted while they bargain, they have
to take into consideration the possibility of employees defection during the development stage.
Second, if they do not include all the informed agents in their Þrm, a second Þrm can be formed,
and they will eventually face competition on the Þnal product market. As a consequence, instead
of earning the whole surplus of the idea, the Þrst Þrm gets π1 ≤ 1, and the second Þrm gets
π2.28,29
In this Section, we focus on two main issues. First, in this model, the market structure is
determined endogenously in equilibrium. Whether we will observe monopoly or competition
arising will depend on the way innovators solve their trade off between forming small Þrms and
allowing for competition and forming large Þrms that preclude competition. In Subsection 4.1 we
analyze the set of equilibria and discuss the market structure outcome. We provide conditions
28These proÞts should be interpreted as incorporating any downstream effects due to imitation. Observe that
1− π1 is a measure of the cost of competition for an incumbent Þrm. Recall that competition implies π1 + π2 ≤ 1
and, since the Þrst Þrm to form chooses the most proÞtable project, π1 ≥ π2. See Section 5 for a discussion of the
case in which π1 + π2 > 1.
29The second Þrm can produce a product identical to the Þrst Þrm, or it can exploit the idea in some secondary
application. To interpret the parameters π1 and π2, notice that our model is consistent with two different situations:
Þrst, consider the case in which there is no secondary application for the idea, and the second Þrm produces a product
identical to the Þrst Þrm. In this case, the two Þrms compete on the same market, so that π1 and π2 are both very
small. If the two products are differentiated, π1 ≤ 1 is due both by the decrease in the Þrst markets size due to the
presence of the second product and by some substitutability between the two products. The parameter π2 measures
the size of the market for the secondary application of the idea, and is also affected by the degree of substitutability
between the two products (e.g., if the two Þrms play Bertrand competition, π2 and π1 are close to zero). π1 close
to 1 occurrs when the secondary application of the idea is is well-differentiated and relatively uninportant. π1 and
π2 both close to 1/2 may denote well-differentiated and equally important applications (e.g. consider the demand
functions derived by Cobb-Douglas utility function u (x, y) = (xy)1/2).
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on the parameters of the model for which competition is the market outcome and conditions for
which monopoly arises.30
Second, as before, we are interested in the ability of a single initial innovator to appropriate the
rents generated by his idea. In Subsection 4.2 we check whether patents are the crucial element
in guaranteeing sizable appropriation rates to innovators.
At the heart of the analysis of this Section is the trade-off that a proposer faces between
making an offer that include all the other k (hi) − 1 other informed agents (and generating a
monopoly market outcome), and making an offer that does not include all of them (and generating
a competition market outcome). We refer to the Þrst kind of offer as grand coalition offer (i.e.
an offer such that nI = k (hi)− 1), and to the second kind of offer as a cost minimizing offer
(i.e. an offer such that nI < k (hi)− 1).
To simplify the exposition, throughout this Section we assume that n is large. In the Appendix
we present the results for the Þnite n case.
4.1 Equilibrium Market Structure
We start the analysis of the equilibrium market structure by observing that if there is a single
innovator monopoly is always the Þnal market outcome.
Lemma 5 When there is a single innovator, the equilibrium market outcome is always a monopoly.
The intuition behind Lemma 5 is simple. When a single innovator makes the Þrst offer, he
can offer to the minimal number of agents he needs and still guarantee himself a monopoly.
This implies that the innovator does not face the trade-off between a grand-coalition and a cost-
minimizing offer, and will always form a monopoly at minimum cost.
Once we start from a larger set of innovators monopoly cannot be guaranteed. When there
are several innovators, the trade-off between large, monopolistic Þrms and small, competitive
Þrms begins to bite. Proposers must decide which path they prefer to follow. Grand coalition
offers involve a larger pie to share but a relatively large number of employees to divide it among.
Alternatively, the proposer can make a cost-minimizing offer, that is, an offer that focuses on
forming a Þrm at the minimal cost, but generates market competition. Therefore, this option
entails a smaller pie to be shared but also a lower total value to be paid to the employees.
30The normative implications of these results are differed to section 5.
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Note that in all SSPE, if the number of informed agents is high enough, a proposer can guarantee
himself almost π1 by making a cost minimizing offer. To see this, notice that in any SP Equilibrium
and any subgame h ∈ HN , the sum of the continuation values of the informed agents cannot be
larger than δ, i.e.,
P
i∈K(h) v
i (h) ≤ δ.31 If the strategies are symmetric, the continuation values of
all the informed players must be equal. Because the pie is bounded in size, this means that when
there are many informed agents, the continuation value of each agent must converge to zero. In
turn, this implies that whenever an agent is called to make an offer, he can guarantee himself
almost π1 by offering to one agent his continuation value.
Proposition 6 offers conditions under which competition arises as equilibrium market outcome.
The proofs of Propositions 6 and 7 are presented in the Appendix.
Proposition 6 If π1 ≥ 1−δ2π21+δ , there exists a k such that for any subgame with k ≥ k informed
agents, there is a unique SSPE. In this equilibrium proposers always make offers to one uninformed
agent. As a result, competition is the only equilibrium market structure outcome.
Proposition 6 establishes sufficient conditions for agents to make only cost-minimizing offers.
If agents make cost-minimizing offers, competition is the equilibrium market structure outcome.
When there are many informed agents in a negotiation subgame, the cost of a grand coalition
offer must be close or above δ (π1 + δπ2), as this is the minimal (discounted) pie that is going to
be shared upon rejection. Therefore, by offering a grand coalition offer, one can expect to receive
at most 1− δ (π1 + δπ2) . On the other hand, by making a cost-minimizing offer the proposer can
secure a payoff of almost π1. Thus, if π1 > 1− δπ1− δ2π2 (i.e., if π1 > 1−δ2π21+δ ), no grand coalition
is offered for high k.
Proposition 6 implies that if the degree of potential market competition is low and the number
of informed agents is high enough, competition is always the equilibrium market outcome. Notice
that since π1+π2 ≤ 1, this prediction is in contrast to bargaining efficiency, which would require
monopoly to arise. The source of this inefficiency is that proposers are restricted in their strategies.
Proposers are forced to offer to all the informed agents if they want to sustain a monopoly. When
the number of informed agents is high and the difference between monopoly rents and π1 is low,
proposers may Þnd it optimal to generate competition instead.
31This follows trivially from the fact that at any history h ∈ HN , the informed agents are dividing a discounted
pie that is smaller or equal to 1.
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The following Proposition relates to the case of high levels of potential market competition, i.e.
low π1.
Proposition 7 If π1 < 1− δ, there is a unique SSPE. In this equilibrium proposers always make
grand coalition offers. Therefore, the equilibrium market outcome is always a monopoly.
The intuition behind Proposition 7 is the following. The cost of making a grand-coalition offer
never exceeds δ. Therefore, a grand coalition offer always guarantees a payoff of at least 1− δ. On
the other hand, a cost-minimizing offer guarantees at most π1. Therefore, if π1 < 1− δ, no agent
would ever make a cost-minimizing offer, no matter how many informed agents there are on the
market.
Proposition 7 guarantees that if π1 is low, monopoly always arises. This implies that no matter
how many innovators are initially aware of the new idea, information remains conÞned within the
boundaries of one Þrm.
The last result has an important implication about information diffusion. Proposition 7 shows
that if π1 is low, offers never include uninformed agents, i.e. nU = 0, and grand coalition offers
are made only to informed agents. This implies that information diffusion never occurs on or off
the equilibrium path. In the next Section we analyze how this feature of the equilibrium relates
to the innovators appropriation rate.
Next, we check the equilibrium outcomes for the middle range of potential market competition,
i.e., π1 ∈ (1− δ, 1−δ2π21+δ ). Proposition 8 shows that in this range there are multiple equilibria and
that one can sustain both competition and monopoly market outcomes in equilibrium.
Proposition 8 If π1 ∈ (1−δ, 1−δ2π21+δ ), there is a k such that for all subgames with k > k informed
agents, there exist both a SSPE in which competition is the market outcome and an equilibrium
in which monopoly is the market outcome.
To give the intuition for this result consider an equilibrium in which competition arises. One
can sustain competition in every subgame using the following strategies. As long as proposers
make cost-minimizing offers, the continuation game involves future cost-minimizing offers. This
entails a large share of the proÞts to the proposers. But proposers may be tempted to go for a
grand-coalition offer. Such behavior is discouraged by the threat that if such offers are made,
continuation games will involve further grand coalition offers that, as we will see in the next
Subsection, tend to increase the continuation value of the employees.
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In the next section we analyze the implication of these results to the innovators appropriation
rates.
4.2 Appropriation Rates in the No Protection Regime
In Section 3, we highlighted the presence of the information diffusion advantage, that enabled
innovators to appropriate sizable shares of the proÞts. However, from Proposition 7, we know that
if the additional threat of potential market competition is added, sometimes information diffusion
disappears in equilibrium. Proposers may prefer to preempt the threat of market competition by
making grand coalition offers that, in equilibrium, do not involve any uninformed agent. One may
wonder to what extent the disappearance of information diffusion affects the innovators payoff.
On the other hand, in the absence of patents, it seems that the threat of market competition
may serve to strengthen the bargaining power of innovators.32 In this Subsection, our aim is to
check how these effects relate to the appropriation rate of a single innovator.33
We start the analysis with an observation: if exactly two agents are informed, the continuation
value of each of them is at most δ2 . This implies that the innovator can always secure 1 − δ2 by
offering δ2 to one agent.
34
In Proposition 9, we show that, for low levels of potential market competition, the unique SSPE
is similar to the equilibrium we characterized in Section 3. Recall that v (δ,∞) is the appropriation
rate of a single innovator for high n.
Proposition 9 If there is a single innovator, there exists a eπ ∈ h1−δ2π21+δ , 1´ such that, if π1 ≥ eπ,
there is a unique SSPE in which (i) proposers always make offers to one uninformed agent, and
(ii) v (δ,∞) > 1− δ2 , and v (δ,∞) is decreasing in π1 and π2.
Proposition 9 implies that the equilibrium characterized in Section 3 holds for a range of values
of π1. Let us now look more carefully at the appropriation rate of the innovator in this equilibrium.
32Anton and Yao (1994) show, in a related model, that the stronger the potential competition on the market, the
higher the appropriation levels of innovators may be.
33 It is easy to relate the following results to the case of sevelar initial innovators.
34Note that this is a result of the assumption that only one agents is needed in the production function. When
the production function involves more and more agents, the minimum payoff an agent can secure tends to 1− δ.
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The innovators appropriation rate is given by
v(δ,∞) = 1− v2 > 1− δ
2
The innovators ability to guarantee a share larger than 1 − δ2 is now due to two effects. The
Þrst effect, the information diffusion advantage, was introduced in Section 3. As the equilibrium
involves information diffusion, the innovator enjoys the lower continuation value of the employee
he offers to. This effect allows the innovator to be able to appropriate more than half of the
surplus of the continuation game, i.e. π1 + δπ2.
But the innovator is succeeding in getting even a higher share. The innovator is able to ap-
propriate also the entire gap between monopoly proÞts and the surplus under competition, i.e.,
1−(π1+δπ2). The innovator is able to do that as he can successfully threaten a potential employee
that if he rejects, the result will be market competition. We term this new effect the threat of
competition advantage.
To understand the threat of competition advantage, notice that the continuation value of the
potential employee is increasing in both π1 and π2. When competition arises in any subgame,
the total pie that is divided among agents is π1 + δπ2. Therefore, as this pie gets larger, agents
continuation values increase. On the other hand, the appropriation rate of the innovator is
decreasing in π1 and π2. As π1 and π2 decrease, the threat of competition in the subgame that
ensues in case of a rejection becomes more powerful. This enables the innovator to pay less to his
employees and therefore increase his own share of the proÞt.
The link between Þercer potential competition on the market and higher bargaining power of
the innovators is very intuitive. In a different model, Anton and Yao (1994) consider this effect and
show that Þercer competition on the market cannot hurt the innovator and often strengthens his
position.35 The main difference between the two models is that, in Anton and Yao, the interaction
35Anton and Yao (1994) analyze a one-period model in which an inventor needs a manufacturer to develop
his business idea. He can exploit the threat to reveal his idea to a second manufacturer to increase is payoff. In
particular, this is the case when the inventor has all the bargaining power in the negotiation with the manufacturers.
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is modeled as a one shot, take-it-or-leave-it game. Our approach relies on the observation that
once the manufacturer knows the idea, he can still suffer from the defection of his own employees
and face an information leakage problem himself. This suggests a bargaining game with a different
protocol, and, as a result, the threat of competition in the continuation game could end up not
being credible. The credibility of the threat of competition is explored in Proposition 9 and in
the next two results. In particular, Proposition 9 shows that for low degrees of potential market
competition, the threat of competition is credible and the innovators does in fact exploit it.
In Proposition 10 we show that for high degrees of potential market competition, the threat of
competition ceases to be credible. As a result, the innovators position is compromised, and he is
unable to appropriate the gap between the monopoly and competition rents.
Proposition 10 If there is a single innovator, and if π1 < 1−δ, we always have v (δ,∞) = 1− δ2 .
Proposition 10 has implications on the employees wages. Notice that the Þrm that arises in
this equilibrium demands a high wages for the employee. This is because, in the equilibrium
described in Proposition 7, informed agents are always included in the grand coalition offers made
in equilibrium. This tends to increase their continuation values, and depress the innovators
appropriation rate even further.36
As already mentioned in Subsection 4.1, for intermediate values of π1, there are multiple equi-
libria. Our Þnal result shows that for values of π1 in [1− δ, 1−δ2π21+δ ] one can sustain equilibria in
which the innovator appropriates the minimum appropriation rate, 1− δ2 , as well as equilibria in
which he is able to appropriate more than 1− δ2 .




, there exist both a
SSPE in which v (δ,∞) = 1− δ2 and a SSPE in which v (δ,∞) > 1− δ2 .
36For the case of k0 > 1 initial innovators, grand coalition Þrms arise and they demand high wages for the
employees. Note that all the employees of the Þrm are guaranteed strictly positive shares of the proÞts, even though
their marginal contribution to the Þrms production is zero. This is because the agents are paid not according to
their productivity but rather accordinlg to the information they hold. Observe that if we compare the wage an
employee earns in the Þrm that forms in equilibrium (i.e. δ
k0
) with the wage that an employee earns in the Þrm that
forms in equilibrium in a Partial Protection regime (i.e. vk0+1), we get that
δ
k0




is explained by the fact that if there are no patents and π1 is low, an informed agent is always included in the
grand coalition that forms upon his rejection. This result is in line with interesting empirical Þndings by Kumar,
Rajan and Zingales (2001), who, in a cross-section and cross-country analysis on Þrm size, show that one of the
explanatory variables of larger Þrm size is the presence of high-wages in the industry.
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In the middle range, a competitive market outcome is sustainable only if the number of informed
agents is high enough. However, Proposition 11 shows that there are equilibria where a single
innovator can still beneÞt from it. In fact, in the equilibrium we present in the Appendix, the
innovators payoff is higher than 1 − δ2 even if a competitive market outcome can be sustained
only for a high enough number of informed agents. The innovators success is again due to the
information diffusion and the threat of competition advantages.
The analysis carried out in this section highlights that, in the absence of legal protection,
innovators appropriation rates are still protected by equilibrium effects. In particular, whenever
π1 > 1 − δ there exist equilibria that provide the innovator with appropriation rates that are
bounded away from the lower bound, i.e. 1− δ2 .
5 Discussion and Welfare Implications
5.1 Modelling Assumptions
Information Leakage. An important feature of our model is the presence of information leakage,
which is captured by assuming that developing an idea requires collaboration and that collabo-
ration entails information sharing. The Þrst of these assumptions is motivated by a production
function increasing in labor. Involving more people in the development stage may increase the
productivity and quicken the development process. The second assumption is motivated by the
incentives of innovators to inform their employees. Information is an input in the development.
The more information is shared with co-workers, the more efficient the development stage may
be.
Therefore, the innovator faces a trade-off. On one hand, he would like to collaborate with
a number of other agents and inform them. On the other hand, he has an incentive to hold
information back as he fears information leakage and employee defection. Innovators will often
solve this trade-off by collaborating with some agents and sharing information to some extent.
In this paper we abstract from the above trade-off by assuming that innovators must hire a
minimal number of agents, and must share all the information with them. These assumptions
simplify our analysis and allow us to focus attention on innovators appropriation rates. As our
results are positive from the point of view of innovators, weakening these assumptions would only
strengthen our results.
The assumption of information sharing should not be interpreted in the sense that all the
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information is exchanged immediately at the time of an offer. We prefer the point of view that
contracts on undeveloped ideas do not become immediately binding. However, there is a moment
in which they do. This moment occurs when the idea becomes well deÞned and when someone
defecting from the original team can still successfully compete with the other informed agents in
the development process. We think about the situation in which an agent can defect at any time
between the moment in which they learn the information and the moment in which the contract
becomes binding.
Bargaining Protocol. The bargaining protocol we use in this paper is a natural benchmark of
the applied situation we address. The symmetry of the probabilities with which nature chooses
the next proposer captures the symmetry among the informed agents. Once an agent is made
aware of the information, nothing differentiates him from the inventor anymore.37 This implies
that every informed agent should have the same probability of being the next proposer.38
In our model, when an agent receives an offer, he is invested with two distinct abilities: he
perfectly learns the idea and he receives veto power on the success of the offer itself (i.e., the
offers are conditional upon the acceptance of all the agents included in them). It is interesting to
discuss the consequences of altering these assumptions by weakening the position of the recipient
of an offer. However, we want to stress that, since the results in this paper show that in the absence
of perfect IPR innovators are still protected by equilibrium effects, improving the position of the
innovator always results in strengthening the point of this paper. The consequences of decreasing
the recipients ability to understand the idea are discussed in an extension of the model presented
in Section 5.4.
Relaxing the second assumption amounts to consider unconditional offers. If offers are uncon-
ditional, the acceptance of one agent is enough for the offer to be binding and a Þrm to form. We
37For symmetric offer probabilities see also Baron and Ferejohn (1989). One could think about an extension in
which the inventor has a deeper understanding of the idea that gives him an advantage in the competition in being
the next offerer, and from there to be chosen by nature with higher probability. Besides increasing the appropriation
rates of the inventor, we conjecture that this would not change the quality of the results.
38One could also think of a different model in which once an offer is rejected, all the informed players can make
simultaneous offers. We do not think that this would add qualitative insight to our analysis. Such a model would
have to specify tie-break rules (e.g. to assign the proÞt if more than one Þrm are formed simultaneously or to resolve
situations of players making simultaneous offers to each other). Then, at least in a partial-protection regime, the
presence of an increased competition advantage of the innovator could be conjectured, as uninformed agents still
face Þercer competition upon rejection.
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Þnd these kinds of offers unÞt for our applied situation because we want to capture the compe-
tition that arises among the informed agents once they all know the information. In order to do
so, we give the possibility of counter-offers to all the informed agents.
In a version of our model in which π1 = 1, π2 = 0 and unconditional offers are possible, consider
the situation in which the innovator offers zero to two agents, and they both accept. This is an
equilibrium, since none of the agents is pivotal in the formation of the Þrm, but the agents are
not given the chance to make a counter-offer after they learn the idea.39 Notice also that this
assumption is consistent with other models in the literature on intra-Þrm bargaining: both Stole
and Zweibel (1996) and Wolinsky (2000) assume renegotiation of all contracts once an agent has
defected from the Þrm.
Market competition. For simplicity, in our model the market can accommodate at most two
Þrms. It is possible to relax this assumption and allow the Þnal product market to accommodate
any number of Þrms. As the number of Þrms increases, the competition gets Þercer, and the
proÞts of all the pre-existing Þrms decrease.40 This extension does not change the quality of our
results. This is because the proposers still face the trade-off between a grand-coalition offer that
would guarantee a monopoly and a cost-minimizing offer that would allow competition to emerge.
The potential competition may be more harmful for the Þrst Þrm, as in competition it can expect
to get at most π1. This increases the incentives to make grand-coalition offers, and expands the
range of parameters for which we expect grand-coalition to emerge.
In the presentation of the model, we restrict our attention to the case in which π1+π2 ≤ 1, i.e.
the presence of a second Þrm can only generate competition and dissipate some of these rents.
Relaxing this assumption and allowing for the case π1+π2 > 1 requires some frictions to prevent
the Þrst Þrm from developing both applications.41 However, the analysis of the π1 + π2 > 1 case
yields to similar results.42
39 In turn, this leads to a lower bound for the innovators payoff in the no protection regime: the innovator has
now the possibility to offer 2 agents and get 1 − 2δπ2. For low values of π2, this is an improvement with respect
to the bound 1 − δ
2
. The results on endogenous market structure display a trade-off between grand-coalition or
cost-minimizing offers similar to the one present in the model we analyze.
40All the possible proÞts are represented by a triangular m×m matrix Π, such that the generic element πi,j is
the proÞt of Þrm i if j Þrms are on the market. We have πi,j > πi,j+1 and πi,j ≥ πi+1,j for all i, j. Moreover,




i≤j+1 πi,j+1.for all i, j.
41E.g. timing problems, necessity to specialize, increasing management costs etc.
42 In particular, if π1 + π2 > 1, it can be easily checked that when all the n agents are informed a grand coalition
offer costs at least (n− 1) δ
n
. Then, whenever π1 > 1− δ, for a high enough number of informed agents competition
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Equilibrium concept. The deÞnition of SSPE given in the Appendix requires two conditions to
be satisÞed. First, the distributions of offers used by the players have to be anonymous. Second,
given the anonymity of the offers, symmetry requires that when nature chooses the next proposer
from among all the informed players, every potential proposer is expected to behave in the same
way. Notice that in every subgame starting with nature about to choose the next proposer,
every potential proposer faces a different set of other informed players and then a different action
set. This makes it impossible for a symmetric strategy proÞle to include offers that discriminate
informed players on the basis of their identity. This is the reason why, in order to establish a
notion of symmetry, we Þrst need strategies to be anonymous with respect to the other players.
Focusing the attention to SSPE simpliÞes the analysis by making the computation of the
equilibrium continuation values sequence tractable. Enlarging the set of equilibria to all the
Subgame Perfect equilibria is likely to generate a high level of indeterminacy in the predictions
of the model. For instance, in the Partial Protection regime, enlarging the set of equilibria to all
the SPE leads to a result in which both almost full appropriation and almost no appropriation
can be supported in equilibrium when agents are very patient.
The focus on SSPE allows us to highlight the strategic aspects that are speciÞc to our bargaining
model in contrast to other models of multi-agent bargaining. Our analysis introduced a novel
equilibrium effect that is driven by the endogeneity of the set of potential proposers. We have
shown that the implication of this effect was an asymmetry in the equilibrium payoffs that holds
even as bargaining frictions disappear.
A possible alternative to SSPE could have been to require equilibria to be Stationary with
respect to the number of informed agents. Although most of the predictions of our analysis remain
the same under this alternative equilibrium concept, we believe that not allowing strategies to
depend on histories is too restrictive to uncover all the strategic insights the model produces.43
Moreover, we conjecture that for a substantial range of parameters, Stationary equilibria may not
exist for an inÞnite-n version of the model.44
arises. Notice that the case π1 ≤ 1−δ is not consistent with the assumption π1 ≥ π2 in the case in which π1+π2 > 1.
This implies that for high enough k we always have a competitive market outcome. However, for lower k we could
still have monopolistic market outcomes.
43 It can be shown that the only SSPE found in Proposition 1 is also the only Stationary SP equilibrium in
the partial protection regime. Also, in the no protection regime, we Þnd grand-coalition offers for high degrees of
competition, and cost-minimizing offers for low degrees of competition under Stationary SP equilibria.







Matching heterogenous agents. In our model, we assumed that agents are homogeneous and that
the only element that differentiates them is the knowledge of the idea. An interesting extension
of our model is to consider a market populated by two types of agents, say type A and type
B (e.g. engineers and venture capitalists). A Þrm must be formed by an assortative match of
these two types. It is easy to show that our results in the partial protection regime extend to
this situation.45 This suggests an important implication of our model on the incentives to Þnance
new ideas. We differentiate between the moment in which an idea arises and the beginning of
its development. While the process of Þnancing innovation was traditionally seen as an up-front
investment followed by a research stage, this view has changed dramatically in the recent past.
After getting a new idea at a relatively low cost, inventors now search for investors to Þnance
its development. Our results suggest that the presence of information leakage increases the share
appropriated by a venture capitalists, so that a weak protection of IPR improves the return of
the investment in the development of new ideas. In fact, even in the presence of a competitive
market for venture capitalists, the presence of information leakage increases the bargaining power
of venture capitalists and increases their appropriation rate with respect to a perfect protection
legal regime.
Stochastic information leakage. Throughout the analysis, we assumed that the act of hir-
ing/developing necessarily involves full sharing of the information about the idea. Obviously, this
is a strong assumption. Organizations Þnd ways to secure information against insiders as well
as against outside intruders. Information is often classiÞed, and different agents gain access to
different pieces of information. These measures will tend to decrease the amount of information
the innovator must share with potential employees. But as long as these measures are costly,
some information will always leak. One way to model such an extension is to assume that there
is a probability α with which an agent who is made an offer learns the idea. Again, we expect
our qualitative results to hold. The SSPE in the partial protection regime is still unique and
45Assume that there are n agents of type A and n agents of type B and that a type-A agent is the Þrst to make
an offer. It is easy to see that the quality of our results remains intact. In fact, in a partial protection regime,
suppose that all 2n agents are informed. Then, symmetry guarantees that the continuation value of each agent is
δ
2n
regardless the type. Suppose now that there is one type-A agent uninformed. If a type A is chosen to make an
offer, he can just hire an informed type B agent for δ
2n . On the other hand, if a type B is chosen to make an offer,





, while offering to an uninformed, he has to pay just
δ
2n
. Working backward, we can build the unique SSPE in which uninformed agents are always made offers to when
available.
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the payoff for the innovator higher than the one of the partner. For high n, the payoff to the
innovator is 1αδ (1 − e−αδ). which is higher than the payoff to the innovator when there is full
information sharing. Moreover, the innovators appropriation rate is decreasing in α and reaches
full appropriation when α approaches zero.
Unstable offers. In our model, we assumed that once a Þrm forms, it is stable and it completes
the development of the product. An alternative modelling assumption can be made. In particular,
we can assume that once a Þrm forms, it breaks down with some exogenous probability α > 0. In
this case, the pie to share in the next period becomes 1−α1−δα in the monopoly case, (π1 + δπ2)
1−α
1−δα
in the competition case. The results in our paper are robust for low α. In particular, uninformed
agents are offered to, and an information diffusion advantage protects the innovators payoff. This
extension is interesting since in equilibrium information diffusion arises on the equilibrium path.
Cost of transmitting information. Our results are robust to the extension in which it is costly
to transmit information. In particular, assume that making an offer to an uninformed agent
involves some training, or time spent in explanations, that translate in some cost c > 0. Making
an offer to an informed agent allows to save such cost. This modiÞcation implies that, when
a high enough number of people are informed, proposers will stop making offers to uninformed
agents, even if some will still be present. However, as long as c is small enough, an information
diffusion advantage is present and protects the innovators payoff. Qualitatively, the results of the
No Protection regime are also unchanged.
5.2 Welfare Implications
A vast literature analyzes the use of IPR to increase the incentives to innovate.46 We suggest that
the effect of patents on the incentives to innovate must be examined more carefully and that the
importance of IPR may have been overvalued. In estimating the trade-off between the harms and
beneÞts of IPR, too much weight was given to the beneÞt side in providing incentives to innovate.
This overestimate is due to the fact that the strategic aspects of information diffusion have
not been taken into consideration. Our analysis of the Partial Protection regime suggests how
information leakage in the development process of a product affects the appropriation rate of an
46The literature on patents is very large. Just to mention the main papers that opened this Þeld, see Schumpeter
(1943), who rasied the claim that monopoly is necessary to encourage R&D, and Arrow (1962), who addressed the
question of how much the Þrm gains from innovation if a life-long patent is available.
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innovator. As a consequence, in the absence of perfect protection of IPR, the innovators payoff
is protected by the information diffusion advantage.
Our analysis of the No Protection regime suggests that incentive to innovate do not disappear
when patents are not available.47 In particular, we showed that monopoly can still arise with no
IPR. This outcome protects innovators from high degrees of potential market competition, and
allows to identify a lower bound for innovators appropriation rates. For lower degrees of potential
market competition the innovators payoff is still protected by the information diffusion advantage.
Moreover, it is also the case that the potential market competition may allow innovators to enjoy
an additional increase in payoff due to the threat of competition advantage.
Another normative point that we derive from the No Protection regime regards the endogenous
market structure analysis. Consider the monopoly market outcome that arises for high degrees
of potential market competition. There are several reasons that suggest that such an outcome
is not socially desirable. First, a monopolistic outcome from the point of view of consumers, is
indistinguishable from the introduction of a patent. Second, the monopoly outcome is based on
information remaining conÞned within the boundaries of the Þrm. This implies that this outcome
precludes any information disclosure. This is not socially desirable as information disclosure may
stimulate incremental research and future discoveries.48
Finally, from the point of view of the innovators incentives, we showed that when monopoly is
the market outcome the appropriation rate is the lowest possible. This is because the innovators
have to bear high costs to recruit all the informed agents, that in this equilibrium have high con-
tinuation values. This suggests that departing from the No Protection regime to introduce narrow
patents should improve social welfare. This is because narrow patents capture the situations in
which the second Þrm markets a product very similar to the Þrst one (i.e. low π1), but do not
apply to lower degrees of market competition, where the social costs of patent introduction may
be higher.49
47See Boldrin and Levine (2002) for a similar conclusion drawn from a different perspective.
48 It has been observed that when one Þrm is the exclusive user of a new technology (either because of secrecy
or because of a patent), cumulative research may end up being discouraged. See Scotchmer (1991) and Scotchmer
(1999). This argument usually relies on the assumptions that either frictions or specialization prevent the Þrst
patent-holder from fully exploiting all the applications of his patent.
49 If the degree of potentail market competition is low, we can have a competitive market outcome. First, this
is desirable for the consumers. Second, it allows for information disclosure as agents do not have incentives to
keep information secret. This may stimulate incremental reseach. Finally, for high π1, the appropriation rates of
innovators are high and their incentives to innovate are relatively protected.
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The legal literature has suggested that innovation still takes place in the presence of weak
enforcement of IPR. In particular, in contrast with common wisdom, Hyde (2000) points out
that the Silicon Valley phenomenon cannot be understood without considering the weak IPR
enforcement guaranteed by the State of California.50 Hydes claims are based on the assumption
that when IPR are weak, information diffusion occurs. Therefore he does not take into account
the incentives of Þrms to protect themselves against information leakage.
In contrast our model takes account of the incentives innovators have to protect their informa-
tion. We derive the conditions under which Hydes claim holds. In particular, given California
law, it is possible to make a case that the high-tech industry in Silicon Valley Þts our No Protection
regime. This industry is also characterized by a very fast growth of the markets, by a constantly
increasing number of applications of high-tech ideas, and by a geographical concentration that
facilitates communication. These facts suggest that π1, π2, and the number of agents initially
aware of new ideas are all high. Our results show that in these cases competition will arise. This
implies that information diffusion may occur, ideas are likely to be fully exploited and disclosed
to stimulate future incremental research.
We explore the relation between IPR and industry performance further in Baccara and Razin
(2001). This projects aim is to explore the conjecture that when a two-sided investment is
required from both employer and employee, a weak protection of IPR and the presence of
information leakage may improve efficiency. It is well known that indivisible property rights
and incomplete contracts generate inefficiency when the employees are required to exert a non-
contractable effort in the production process. In fact, as an employee fails to appropriate the
full value generated by his effort, his incentives to exert it are destroyed. It has been suggested
by Aghion and Tirole (1994) and Lester and Talley (2001).that different allocations of property
rights could help to improve this inefficiency as they provide more incentives for the employees.
However, these papers take an optimal contract approach and compare some exogenously given
property rights allocations.
In Baccara and Razin (2001), we argue that when IPR are weak, the presence of information
leakage itself endogenously delivers a more equal division of the value and thus improves efficiency.
To see this, consider an example in which a non-contractable effort from two agents is required to
50California prohibits no-compete clauses (unless one of a number of exceptions are met). The application extent
of patents in software industry is also an issue that does not seem to have found a precise legal answer yet (see
Bensen and Raskind (1991)).
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carry out the development of a product. Assume that the production function is V (a, b) = (ab)
1
2 ,
where a, b ∈ <+ are the efforts of the employer and employee, respectively. The cost of effort is
the same for both agents involved in the production, and it is deÞned by c (e) = e
2
2 , where e = a, b.
The Þrst best effort levels (a, b) maximize V (a, b)− a22 − b
2
2 and they are a = b = 1/2. Without
the presence of information leakage (when IPR are perfectly enforced), we have that if x ∈ [0, 1]
is the share of the employee, the employers effort is a (x) = K 0 (1− x) 34 x 14 and the employees
one is b (x) = K0x
3
4 (1− x) 14 for some positive constant K0. By solving the employers problem,
it is easy to see that he offers the employee the share x∗ = 1/4.
Consider now the case in which there is information leakage, and focus on an example in which
n = 3. Let us consider a strategy proÞle in which proposers always offer an uninformed agent the
minimum between his continuation value (i.e., vk) and 1/4. 51 When everybody is informed about
the idea (i.e. k = 3), the employer has to pay an employee at least his continuation value upon
rejection v3, which is the third part of the total value of the pie, V (a (x3) , b (x3))− c (a (x3))−
c (b (x3)), discounted by δ. The employer has to Þnd a share x3 ∈ [0, 1] that solves the following
maximization problem
maxx K
00 (1− x) 32 x 12
s.t.V (a (x) , b (x))− c (b (x)) ≥ v3
(1)
where K00 is a positive constant. In equilibrium, the constraint of (1) is satisÞed as long as
x3 ≥ δ3 . We have that if δ3 < 14 , the participation constraint of the employee is not binding, so




4 , the constraint is binding, and the
employer offers x3 = δ3 . Suppose now that x3 =
δ
3 , and let us consider the case in which 2 agents
are informed. As the payoff of the proposer is monotonically decreasing for shares higher than














If δ is not too small, we have that x2 ≥ x3 (for instance, if δ = 0.9, we have that x3 = 0.3 and
x2 = 0.311). This implies that it is optimal to offer the uninformed over the other informed agent,
as the equilibrium requires. Observe that both these shares improve efficiency with respect to the
51Moreover, employees always accept if and only if offered at least their continuation value. If everybody is
informed, offerers always choose one employee by selecting him randomly between the other two agents with the
same probability.
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no-leakage case as it is easy to check that the welfare objective function is increasing in x up to
1/2. In this example the presence of information leakage improves efficiency by guaranteeing a
more equal distribution of the proceeds of an idea.
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To deÞne Symmetric Subgame Perfect Equilibria, we Þrst have to require strategies to be anonymous.
Let σi be a mixed strategy of player i ∈ N . We say that σi is anonymous if at any history hi ∈ HO, σi (hi)
can be described by a triple
¡
nI , nU , γ
¢
, where nI and nU are the number of informed and uninformed
agents getting the offer, respectively, and γ is the vector of shares offered to each agent.52 The agents
included in the offer are randomly chosen from among the two groups.53 The vector γ has dimension
nI + nU . The Þrst nI elements, the shares offered to the informed agents, are all equal to γI and the
remaining nU elements, the shares offered to the uninformed agents, are all equal to γU .54
DeÞnition 1 A Subgame Perfect equilibrium is Symmetric if σi is anonymous for any i ∈ N and
at any hi, hj ∈ HO following the same history h ∈ N , σi (hi) and σj (hj) can be described by the
same triple
¡
nI , nU , γ
¢
. Moreover, at any h0 ∈ HR, σi (h0) and σj (h0) are the same for any i and
j who are playing at h0.
Proof of Proposition 1: Consider the following strategy proÞle: every proposer always offers one
uninformed agent his continuation value, and every offer is accepted if and only if an agent is offered his
continuation value or more. The sequence {vk}nk=2 of the continuation values of each informed player at
the beginning of a renegotiation subgame with k informed players is deÞned by vk =
δ
k (1− vk+1) and
vn =
δ
n . We prove that this is the unique SSPE by backward induction on the number of people informed.
Start from a subgame in which all the n agents are informed. Symmetry guarantees that vn =
δ
n . Let
us now move to a subgame in which n − 1 agents are informed. Consider the options of a proposer. He
can form a Þrm with one or more informed agents, he can offer to the only uninformed agent, or he can
make an offer to both informed and uninformed agents. If the offer includes the uninformed, every offered
agent has to be paid δn , so the uninformed is offered to. Suppose you offer to one or more informed agents
instead. Upon rejection, each of them will be the next proposer with probability 1n−1 , and in that case he
can guarantee himself 1− δn in that case. Then, an offer that does not include the uninformed agent must
52This implies that nI ∈ {0, 1, ..k (hi)− 1}, nU ∈ {0, 1, .., n− k (hi)} , and γ is such that γ ≥ 0 andP
i γi ≤ 1.
53Then, since at history hi there are card (K (hi) \ {i}) informed agents and card (N\K (hi)) uninformed
agents, each informed agent gets the offer with probability n
I
card(K(hi)\{i}) , and each uninformed agent gets
the offer with probability n
U
card(N\K(hi)) .
54More generally, we could allow for any mixture of these strategies. The results would remain the same
under this alternative formulation.
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> δn , offering to the uninformed dominates




. It is also easy to check that
vn−1 < 2vn. Let us now Þx k and assume as an inductive hypothesis that in all subgames starting with
a number of informed agents h ∈ {k + 1, .., n− 1}, every proposer always offers exactly one uninformed,









Let us also assume that for any s ∈ {1, .., n− k − 1}, we have
(s+ 1) vk+s+1> svk+s (2)
Focus on a subgame starting with k informed agents. Notice that every proposer can offer to one or
more uninformed agents, to one or more informed agents, or to both informed and uninformed agents.
Notice that (2) guarantees that offering to one uninformed always dominates offering to more than one
uninformed. Also, if an offer includes one uninformed, each agent in the offer has to be paid vk+1. If one
offers to one or more informed, each has to be paid at least δk (1− vk+1). However, notice that since
vk+1 =
δ




(1− vk+1) ≥ δ
k
(













which shows that offering to one uninformed dominates offering to one or more informed agents. More-



















This implies (s+ 1) vk+s > svk+s−1. This concludes the proof that the candidate strategy proÞle is
indeed the only SSPE¥
Proof of Corollary 2: Assume K0 = {1} . From Proposition 1, we know that as n goes to inÞnity,


















(k − 1 + i)!(−1)
i−1
In particular, we have bv2 = 1δ ¡e−δ − 1 + δ¢. This implies that the payoff of the innovator is given by














Notice that v (δ) = 1 and limδ→1v(δ) = .63212¥
Proof of Proposition 3: The sequence {vmk }nk=2 of the continuation values of the informed play-








1− (n− k) δn
¢




for k < n−m.
We show that this is the only SSPE by backward induction on the number of informed agents k. Let all
the n agents be informed. Then, symmetry guarantees that vmn =
δ
n .
Let now the number of informed people be n− 1. Any proposer can involve the only uninformed agent
in his offer or decide to offer only to informed agents. If the offers includes the uninformed, each player
included in the offer has a reservation value of δn .








n . To prove this claim, observe that upon rejection, an informed agent, say i, will





. If he is not chosen as next proposer (event that occurs with probability
n−2
n−1), only two cases are possible: the next proposer is going to include the uninformed in the offer, or the
next offer is not going to include the uninformed in the offer. In the Þrst case, symmetry guarantees that
player i is going to be included in the offer with probability not inferior to m−1n−2 (the probability is going
to be greater if the offer involves more than m people) and he gets δn , while in the second case, symmetry
guarantees that player i is going to be included in the offer with probability not inferior to mn−2 and that
the least he gets is
δ(1− δn)
n−1 as the entire pie to share among all the agents is δ, while a maximum of
δ
n can















n−1 . This implies our claim.












































Notice that vmn−1 < 2vmn .
Let now Þx k + 1 > n −m and assume as an inductive hypothesis that for all n − 2 ≥ h ≥ k + 1,
we have that in all the subgames starting with h agents informed, all the available n − h uninformed
agents are offered, and the remaining m− n+ h agents necessary to form the Þrm are chosen with equal




h+1+s < (s+ 1) v
m
h+2+s. Let us now
focus on a subgame starting with k informed agents. Observe that any proposer, say i, can exhaust the
uninformed agents and pay δn each, or decide to substitute some uninformed agents with informed ones.
If he chooses the second option and he offers to, say s > 0, uninformed agents, he has to pay each agent




n . This implies that offering to all uninformed
dominates this option. Suppose then that s = 0, meaning that proposer i only offers to informed agents.










k . In fact, notice that symmetry guarantees that if agent i does not offer to any
uninformed, the other agents do not so either. This implies that 1k is the probability of being chosen as
next proposer, 1−m δn is the payoff he can guarantee himself in that event, k−1k is the probability of not
being chosen as the next proposer, mk−1 is the probability that agent j is included in the offer of someone







































This implies that, again, offering to all available uninformed agents dominates offering to only informed




















1− (n− k) δ
n
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1− (n− k − 1) δn
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which conclude the inductive proof for k ≥ n−m.
To complete the construction of the equilibrium sequence, take as Þrst step of the new induction the












We have already showed that vmn−m > vmn−m+1 and that
vmn−m+1
vmn−m
> n−mn−m+1 . Let us now Þx k < n−m
and assume as an inductive hypothesis that for h ≥ k + 1, we have vmh > vmh+1 and
vmh+1
vmh
> hh+1 , so that
offers are always made to exactly m uninformed agents. Focus now on a subgame starting with k agents
informed. If a proposer offers only to uninformed agents, he has to pay each of them vmk+m. If he offers to
s < m uninformed agents, he has to pay each agent vmk+s, but we know by our inductive hypothesis that
vmk+s > v
m
k+m, so it is optimal to offer to all uninformed agents instead. Finally, suppose the proposer













as by inductive hypothesis vmk+m ≤ δk+m . It is then always optimal to extend the offer only to uninformed.
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−m (k − 1 +m) (m+ 1)






















k − 1 +m(1− δ)





k − 1 + mm+1
=
k























Proof of Corollary 4: Focus on the case in which n is large. For any number of players n and any
optimal Þrm size m+1, Proposition 3 guarantees that there exists a unique SSPE such that the sequence
























where vmk (∞) ≡ limn→∞ vmk (n) . The innovators appropriation rate is v(m, δ,∞) ≡ 1−mvmm+1 (∞) ,
which for large m is approximated by
lim







As δ tends to 1, we have limδ→1 v(∞, δ,∞) = e−1 ' 0.368¥
Proof of Proposition 6: Focus on a subgame where all n agents are informed. Then, any proposer
can offer to an uninformed agent and guarantee himself π1− δn (by symmetry, δn is the maximum possible
continuation value of another player), or he can make a grand-coalition offer. If he makes a grand coalition
offer, as π1 + δπ2 < 1, the least he has to pay each player is
δ
n (π1 + δπ2), so that the minimum cost of
the offer is (n− 1) δn (π1 + δπ2) . Notice that, under our assumption, we have
1−δ (n− 1)
n
(π1 + δπ2)≤ π1− δ
n
42
This implies that making a cost-minimizing offer dominates making a grand-coalition offer¥
Proof of Proposition 7: Suppose that n agents are informed. Then, we have that making a cost-
minimizing offer costs at least δ π1+δπ2n and a grand coalition offer costs at most (n− 1) δn . This implies









n , or π1 <
n−(n−1)δ+δ2π2
n−δ , which is satisÞed by assumption. Then,
we have vn =
δ
n . Let us move to a subgame where n−1 agents are informed. Any chosen proposer can offer
to all the other players and pay (n− 1) δn , he can decide to make an offer only to the other n−2 informed
players, paying each at most δn−1 (in this case he pays at most (n− 2) δn−1 < (n− 1) δn), or he can
decide to offer only to the only uninformed player and get π1− δn . Observe that π1− δn < 1−(n− 2) δn−1
if π1 < 1− (n− 2) δn−1 + δn . However, we have
π1<
n− (n− 1) δ + δ2π2
n− δ < 1−
n− 2
n




This guarantees that vn−1 = δn−1 . Assume now as an inductive hypothesis that vk+1 =
δ
k+1 and in
all the subgames with k + 1 or more agents informed, only informed agents receive offers. Then, focus on
a subgame starting with k agents informed. Every proposer has the choice of making a cost-minimizing
offer, exactly a grand coalition offer or to make a more extended grand coalition offer. In the last case, he
has to pay (h− 1) δh with h ≥ k + 1, while with an offer made only to informed agents, he pays at most
(k − 1) δk < (h− 1) δh for h ≥ k + 1. Making a cost-minimizing offer yields π1 − δk+1 . We have that
π1 − δk+1 < 1− (k − 1) δk if π1 < 1− (k − 1) δk + δk+1 , but we have
π1<
n− (n− 1) δ + δ2π2
n− δ < 1−
n− 2
n





This concludes the proof¥
Proof of Proposition 8 Let us build a SSPE in which at any history h ∈ HO such that k(h) > k¯,
all the informed agents at a history h offer a grand coalition if chosen by nature as next offerers (subgame
of type 1). If one of the players chooses to offer the grand coalition, let all the players offer an uninformed
player in the subsequent subgame. To support a subgame in which all the players make an offer to an






1− (k − 1) v2k
¢
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Notice that limk v1k = limk v
2
k = 0. To check if a subgame of type 1 is a SSPE we show that
1− (k − 1) v2k> π1 (3)
Notice that limk
£
1− (k − 1) v2k
¤
= 1 − δπ1 − δ2π2 > π1, so for high k (3) is satisÞed. Also, we
need to check that it is not optimal to offer to more than the grand coalition, but we can sustain this by
imposing a type 1 subgame upon rejection. Therefore we must have
1− (k − 1) v2k> 1− (k +m− 1) v1k+m
or
(k − 1) v2k< (k +m− 1) v1k+m
This is satisÞed as limk (k − 1) v2k = δπ1 + δ2π2 and limk→∞ (k +m− 1) v1k+m = δ. Moreover, we
know that δπ1 + δ
2π2 > δ as π1 <
1−δ2π2
1+δ < 1− δπ2.
Now, to check the sustainability of the subgames of type 2, we need to check that
π1 − v1k+1> 1− (k − 1) v1k (4)
But we have limk
£















= 1− δ < π1, so that (4) is satisÞed as well.¥
Proof of Proposition 9:We need to show that there is eπ (π2, δ, n) < 1 such that if π1 > eπ (π2, δ, n),
then always offering one uninformed agent is an equilibrium. In this strategy proÞle, the continuation
value sequence is {vk}nk=2 deÞned by vn = δn (π1 + δπ2) and vk = δk (π1 − vk+1) + δ(k−1)k π2v?k−1,
where we denote by {v∗k}nk=2 the (unique) SSPE sequence we studied in the π1 = 1, π2 = 0 case
(observe that after the formation of the Þrst Þrm, if k informed agents are left on the market, each
agent has a continuation value of δπ2v∗k.) To show that this is an equilibrium, we need to prove that
the sequence {vk}nk=2 is decreasing, that mvk+m < (m+ 1) vk+m+1 for all k and m such that 1 ≤
m ≤ n − k − 1, and that offering to one uninformed always dominates making a grand-coalition offer.
Let us Þrst show that the sequence {vk}nk=2 is decreasing and that mvk+m < (m+ 1) vk+m+1 for all
k,m. To see that {vk}nk=2 is decreasing, notice that we have vk = δk (π1 − vk+1) + δ(k−1)k π2v∗k−2 and
vn =
δ
n (π1 − vn)+ δ(n−1)n ( 1n−1vn+ n−2n−1π2v∗n−2) where v∗n−2 = δn−2 . Therefore, vn = δn(π1+ δπ2) and


















In the same way, it is easy to see that
lim
π1→1
[(m+ 1) vk+m+1] > lim
π1→1
[vk+1mvk+m]
for all 1 ≤ m ≤ n − k − 1. So, there exists π0 (π2, δ, n) < 1 such that for all π1 ≥ π0 (π2, δ, n) the
sequence {vk}nk=2 is decreasing and satisÞes mvk+m < (m+ 1) vk+m+1.
To show that offering to one uninformed always dominates making a grand-coalition offer we need




























for all k. So, by continuity with respect to π1, there is π00 (π2, δ, n) < 1, such that for all π1 ≥
π00 (π2, δ, n) , (5) is satisÞed for all k. DeÞne the bound eπ (π2, δ, n) ≡ max [π0 (π2, δ, n) ,π00 (π2, δ, n)] .











































(k + i+ j)!
(−1)j−1))

which is increasing in both π1 and π2. This implies that the appropriation rate of the innovator,
v (δ) = 1− v2, is decreasing in π1¥
Proof of Proposition 11: Let π1 ∈ [π (π2, δ, n) ,π (π2, δ, n)], and consider the strategy proÞle
in which as long as at least two agents are informed, everybody always offers to all the other agents. If
45
someone does not, when 2 < k ≤ n − 1, then upon rejection we go in grand coalition stage (which by
Proposition ??, we know it is sustainable either with another grand coalition stage upon rejection, or with
alternating stages). As soon as along the equilibrium path everybody is informed, if a proposer offers to
one agent, upon rejection all agents offer to one agents (competition arises). If a grand coalition is offered
instead, we have a grand coalition arising upon rejection. To show that this is an equilibrium, start from a
subgame where everybody is informed. Notice that since π (π2, δ, n) < π1 < π (π2, δ, n) , we can sustain
both competition and grand coalition in that stage. To sustain competition, let competition arise if an
uninformed is offered, and let grand coalition arise if a grand coalition offer is made. Then, one prefers to
offer to just one agent since
π1− δ
n
(π1 + δπ2)> 1− (n− 1) δ
n
is satisÞed as π1 > π (π2, δ, n) . To sustain a grand coalition offer, let competition arise upon rejection,





δ (π1 + δπ2)
which is satisÞed as π1 < π (π2, δ, n).





















(n− k) (π1 + δπ2)




< 1− (n− 1) δ
n
(π1 + δπ2)
which is guaranteed to be true by π1 < π (π2, δ, n)..
Now, if the one described is the continuation of the game, the innovator can offer to one other agent. If


















− (n− 2) δ
2
2n




In this equilibrium the innovator gets at least
1−δ
2
+ (n− 2) δ
2
2n
(π1 + δπ2)> 1−δ
2
which is increasing in π1 and π2. By having competition sustainable in the last step, we have built an
equilibrium in which appropriation rate of the innovator is higher than 1− δ2 . For high n, the innovator
can do even better than that. In fact, if we let ek = min [2, k], where k is the smallest k ≤ n−1, such that
π1 ≥ 1−(k − 1) δk+ δk+1 , we can sustain competition arising when there are ek agents informed, so that the
innovator can also offer ek−1 agents δek (π1 + δπ2) and get 1−³ek − 1´ vek ≥ 1−³ek − 1´ δek (π1 + δπ2) ,
which is decreasing in π1 and π2. Notice that
1−
³ek − 1´ δek (π1 + δπ2) > 1− (n− 1) δn (π1 + δπ2)
> 1− δ
2




if (π1 + δπ2) <
n
n(2+δ)−2(1+δ) which is always satisÞed for high n since π1 + δπ2 < 1.
Let now show that if π1 < π (π2, δ, n) =
n+δ−(n−1)δ2π2
n+(n−1)δ , there is always an equilibrium in which the
innovator appropriates 1− δ2 . First, let π1 < 1− n−2n δ, and conjecture an equilibrium in which the grand
coalition is always offered. If everybody is informed, observe that in our hypothesis, π1− δn < 1−(n− 1) δn .
This implies that offering the grand coalition is sustainable. Then, we can work backward by induction
and, using the fact that 1 − n−2n δ < 1− (k − 1) δk + δk+1 for all k ≤ n − 1, we can show that offering
always exactly to the grand coalition is sustainable again. Then, we have that the innovator appropriates
1− δ2 .
Now, assume that 1 − n−2n δ < π1 < π (π2, δ, n) . First, let ek = min [2, k] where k is the smallest
k ≤ n− 1, such that π1 ≥ 1− (k − 1) δk + δk+1 . Then, every time k ≥ ek and we enter the Þrst subgame
in which k people are informed, let every proposer offer to the grand coalition. Upon rejection, let every
proposer offer to one uninformed agent and so on. If k < ek, let the agents always make a grand coalition
offer. To check that this is an equilibrium, let us Þrst check any k ≥ ek. We have that

























Upon rejection, we have that proposers offer to one uninformed as
π1− δ
k + 1
≥ 1− (k − 1) δ
k
47
which is equivalent to π1 ≥ 1− (k − 1) δk + δk+1 , which is satisÞed by deÞnition of ek. If k < ek, we have
π1− δ
k + 1
< 1− (k − 1) δ
k
so that a grand coalition offer dominates offering to an uninformed. Notice also that as (k − 1) δ(π1+δπ2)k <
(k − 1) δk < k δk+1 , it is never optimal to offer to more than the grand coalition and, as δk+1 < m δk+m , it
is never optimal to offer to more than one uninformed. In this equilibrium, the innovators payoff is again
1− δ2¥
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